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Arbitration is a voluntary method of alternative dispute resolution that is used to 
settle contract and related disputes, including disputes between private parties arising 
under statutes. The use of arbitration has been burgeoning in recent years. In 2002, for 
example, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), only one of the many providers 
of arbitration services to disputants, handled 230,255 cases.1 Arbitration, however, is 
controversial when used to settle employment and consumer disputes.2 Critics call such 
arbitration “mandatory arbitration” because agreements to arbitrate often are contained in 
adhesion contracts that, the critics say, leave the employee or consumer no choice but to 
1
 Am. Arbitration Ass’n., A Brief Overview of the American Arbitration Association, 
http://www.adr.org/overview (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
2 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement 
of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); 
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695; Samuel Estreicher, 
Predispute Agreements To Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997);
Symposium, Mandatory Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2004); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer 
Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer 
Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996).
2agree to arbitration.3 The critics apparently believe that arbitration provides second-class 
resolutions of such disputes to the prejudice of employees and consumers. Many 
advocate that arbitration should be banned or limited in these cases, leaving a party free 
to resort to litigation despite its agreement to arbitrate.4
Many courts appear to be among the critics despite proclamations by the United 
States Supreme Court that there is a statutorily-based federal policy – applicable 
throughout the full range of the Commerce Clause, in state and federal courts alike –
favoring arbitration. In many cases, mostly decided since 2000, these courts refuse to 
enforce arbitration agreements by finding them unconscionable under state contract law.5
They give a wide range of reasons for such a conclusion. The net effect of these decisions 
3
 See, e.g., Michael D. Donovan & David A. Searles, Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How To 
Combat Overreaching Arbitration Clauses, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 269, 278-79 (1 998); Stephan 
Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1601-02 (2005); Mandatory 
Arbitration, supra note 2; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631, 1632 n.1 (2005).
4
 E.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration , 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
133, 161-66 (2004); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 125-32.
5
 Instead of relying on the unconscionability doctrine, some courts have used other contract law doctrines.  
E.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 383-84 (6th Cir. 2005) (mutual assent 
lacking); Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd. 840 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Ariz. 1992) 
(reasonable expectations under an adhesion contract preclude enforcement of arbitration agreement); Cheek 
v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 661- 62 (Md. 2003) (lack of mutuality precludes 
enforcement of arbitration clause); cf. GreenPoint Credit, LLC v. Reynolds, 151 S.W.3d 868, 875 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2004) (reasonable expectations regarding mutuality of exception to arbitration agreement preclude 
enforcement to the extent not mutual).
3is to provide unprecedented judicial review of arbitration agreements for judicially-
perceived reasonableness or fairness, not unconscionability.6
This Article’s thesis is that these courts have gone too far, often failing to follow 
the applicable law as enunciated in federal pre-emption cases by the United States 
Supreme Court or as encompassed by state contract law. It affirms that there are cases in 
which an arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it is unconscionable under 
generally applicable state contract law. It suggests, however, that many judicial refusals 
to enforce are based on clearly erroneous reasons. It is hard to resist the conclusion that 
many courts are hostile to arbitration,7 as were courts until passage of the United States 
Arbitration Act in 1925 (generally known as the “Federal Arbitration Act” or “FAA”). 8
According to the Supreme Court, the point of that legislation was to end judicial 
hostility.9 The Supreme Court has found in the FAA a strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration.  It has held that state laws contrary to this policy are pre-empted.
6 See infra text accompanying note 102.
7
 One court wrote:  “The reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and 
right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical 
attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic.”  Knepp v. Credit 
Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (Sledge, J.).
8
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).  This Article will refer to this statute as the “FAA.”
9
 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989).  Counterpart state legislation has the same effect.  For 
example, the precursor to the Federal Arbitration Act was an arbitration statute enacted in New York in 
1920. New York Arbitration Law, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 
7501 (McKinney 1998)) (cited in Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Toward an Expectation 
Model, 56 Baylor L. Rev. 753, 755 n.7 (2004)).  See REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000).
4Part I of this Article sketches the basics of arbitration law and practice and traces 
the development of the federal policy favoring arbitration – to establish a basis for 
evaluating contemporary judicial decisions. Part II examines the justification for the 
policy favoring arbitration and the reasons contracting parties may prefer arbitration. Part 
III evaluates the reasons courts give for finding arbitration agreements in employment 
and consumer contexts unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The conclusion is 
that many courts make many clearly erroneous decisions, including decisions that are or 
should be pre-empted, manifesting a new judicial hostility to arbitration.
I.  Arbitration Law and Practice
A.  The Arbitration Process
Arbitration is a matter of contract: There can be no valid arbitration without the 
disputing parties’ agreement.10 Most often, the parties agree to arbitrate as part of a 
“container contract” providing for a substantive exchange and containing an arbitration 
clause. These agreements are known as “pre-dispute” arbitration agreements.11 When 
concluding pre-dispute agreements, however, the parties – or at least the weaker party –
may not think about the kinds of disputes that may arise or the procedures to be employed 
to settle them. For employees and consumers, even reading a pre-dispute arbitration 
10
 FAA § 10(a).
11
 Occasionally, the parties conclude a stand-alone arbitration agreement after a dispute has arisen.  These 
agreements are known as “submission” agreements or “post-dispute” agreements.  Almost no one criticizes 
post-dispute agreements because they are concluded with awareness of the nature of the dispute and of the 
relevant arbitration process.  See Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract 
Provisions Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
207, 218-20 (2004).
5clause – which is rare – may not produce much understanding.12 Lawyers representing 
such parties usually are not involved at this stage.
In the typical cases considered for this Article, a dispute arises between an 
employee or consumer, on one hand, and an employer or retail seller, on the other. The 
weaker party – one of the former – is the one aggrieved by an alleged breach of contract 
or a violation of a statute applicable in a contractual relationship. The weaker party files a 
lawsuit in a court. At least in federal court, the stronger party files motions under the 
FAA to compel arbitration and to stay litigation.13 Following argument, and a factual 
hearing in some cases, the court denies these motions, thereby refusing to enforce the 
arbitration agreement. A lawsuit presumably follows.
When the court enforces the arbitration agreement, the claimant may file a 
“demand” for arbitration – in most cases with an arbitration services provider such as the 
AAA, as set forth in the agreement and the service provider’s rules.14 The respondent will 
receive a copy of the demand and file an answer.15 The parties will proceed to select their 
arbitrator or arbitrators, who need not be lawyers but may be experts in the relevant 
12 Id.
13
 FAA §§ 3-4.
14 E.g., Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes, Rule C-2(a) 
(effective Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 [hereinafter AAA Supplementary 
Procedures]; Am. Arbitration Ass’n, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, Rule 4b(i)
(effective Sept. 15, 2005), www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22075 [hereinafter AAA National Rules].
15 E.g., AAA Supplementary Procedures, supra note 14, at Rule C-2(c); AAA National Rules, supra note 
14, at Rule 4b(ii).
6field.16 If the parties cannot agree, the service provider or a court will appoint the 
arbitrator.17 The arbitrator, after hearing the parties, will adopt a procedure for the 
arbitration, in accordance with the arbitration agreement. In a case with large stakes, he 
or she may decide upon requests from the parties, require discovery as appears 
appropriate in the case, receive pre-trial summaries of the parties’ cases, and conduct a 
hearing on the merits.18 Following the hearing, the arbitrator may or may not receive 
post-hearing submissions.  He will decide the case and issue an award. A victorious party 
can move a court to confirm the award and enter it as a judgment of the court.19 It then 
must be recognized and enforced the same extent as would be a judicial judgment. In all 
cases, the arbitration is governed primarily by the arbitration agreement and any 
arbitration rules incorporated therein. The costs of the arbitration, including the 
arbitrator’s fee, are borne by the parties, as agreed in the arbitration agreement or as the 
arbitrator may decide.20
Arbitrations greatly vary from one to another. When the stakes are small, the 
arbitration will be brief and simple, taking only a few hours, by telephone or in person, 
short-circuiting the extensive procedures employed in litigation (outside of small claims 
16
 Though arbitration tribunals may consist of one or more arbitrators, this Article will encompass in 
“arbitrator” tribunals with more than one member.
17
 FAA § 5; e.g., AAA Supplementary Procedures, supra note 14, at Rule C-4; AAA National Rules, supra
note 14, at Rule 12b.
18 Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Commercial Arbitration Rules, Rules R-1, R-20 to -35 (effective Sept. 15, 2005), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 [hereinafter AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules].
19
 FAA §§ 9-10, 13.
20
 AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 18, at Rule R-50.
7court). Even when the stakes are large, the arbitration will be tailored to the dispute. 
Generally speaking, claims will not be dismissed nor summary judgment granted prior to 
a hearing on the merits. There may be little or no discovery or discovery limited to 
documents only. A hearing on the merits dispenses with the rules of evidence. There is no 
jury in arbitration.21
If something goes seriously wrong in the arbitration process, there is a judicial 
remedy. Courts may be called on to confirm an award.22 The losing party may seek to 
vacate the award.23 The FAA specifies the grounds for vacating an award. They are:  
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent 
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights 
of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made.24
21
 It has long been held that, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party implicitly waives its right to a jury trial.  
Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1187 (Cal. 1976).  See generally Stephen J. Ware, 
Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004).
22
 FAA § 9.
23 Id. § 10.
24 Id.
8In some jurisdictions, an award may be vacated, in addition, when the arbitrator 
manifestly disregarded the law.25 Vacating an award, however, is unusual; it is not the 
result of a robust appeal.
B.  The Old Judicial Hostility 
Recourse to arbitration was common in medieval England and seems to have been 
favored by the courts. In 1608, however, Lord Coke’s influential dictum in Vynior’s 
Case26 began a trend toward judicial disfavor, at least with respect to the enforceability of 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. In that case, Robert Vynior brought an action in debt 
against William Wilde on a bond of twenty pounds. Wilde’s commitment under the bond 
was to observe and perform the arbitral award of a named arbitrator who had the 
authority by the parties’ agreement “to rule, order, adjudge, arbitrate, and finally 
determine all Matters, Suits, Controversies, Debates, Griefs and Contentions” as 
described. Coke gave judgment on the bond for Vynior, but in dicta observed that a party 
could countermand his obligation to arbitrate. He reasoned, oddly, that to decide 
otherwise would be to make “not countermandable, which is by the law and of its own 
nature countermandable.”27 He also analogized the arbitration agreement to powers of 
attorney or the provisions of a last will and testament, which were and are revocable.  
Hostility to arbitration agreements evolved from Vynior’s Case into a contest 
between arbitration and the judiciary. In 1749, a plaintiff brought an action on an 
25 E.g., Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002); see First Options of Chi., 
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995).
26
 8 Co. Rep. 80a.  
9insurance policy and the defendant defended on the basis of the arbitration clause in the 
policy. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff because “the agreement of the parties [to 
arbitrate] cannot oust this court” of jurisdiction.28 The idea that an agreement to arbitrate 
ousts the courts of jurisdiction was influential in England until the Arbitration Act of 
1889.29 That act provided that a submission, unless it expressed a contrary intention, was 
irrevocable and had the same effect as if made by court order. It also made the first stab 
at rules of law which would facilitate the conduct of an arbitration, such as the 
appointment of arbitrators when the parties failed to do so, empowering arbitrators to 
summon witnesses and examine them under oath, making awards final, and empowering 
arbitrators to award costs. In England, then, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, but it had largely evaporated by the turn of the 
twentieth century.
The history in England had a large effect on nineteenth century judicial attitudes 
toward arbitration in the United States. Before 1920, the United States courts tended to 
enforce arbitral awards rendered before a judicial proceeding was commenced unless the 
arbitration was a product of collusion to defraud a third party.30 Agreements to arbitrate,
however, were another matter. Nineteenth century courts “simply assumed that such 
27 Id. at 81b-82a.  (Coke’s reports at 302-304).  
28
 Kill v. Hollister, 18 Geo. 2, 1 Wils 129 (quoted in Robert B. von Mehren, From Vynior’s Case to 
Mitsubishi:  The Future of Arbitration and Public Law, 477 PRAC. L. INST./COM. 177, 182 (1988)).
29
 von Mehren, supra note 28, at 183 (referring to the Arbitration Act of 1889, 52 and 53 Vict., ch. 49.).
30 Id. at 185 (citing Karthaus v. Yllas y Ferrer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 222, 228 (1828); Houseman v. Cargo of the 
Schooner N.C., 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 40 (1841)).
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clauses were revocable and non-enforceable.”31 Thus, in 1874, the Supreme Court 
announced a principle of the non-enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 
“Every citizen,” the Court wrote, “is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and 
to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him.”32 In a 
civil case, a party “may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or 
to the decision of a single judge,” but a party “cannot . . . bind himself in advance by an 
agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and 
on all occasions.”33 The precedents, the Court reasoned, show that “agreements in 
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”34
C.  Advent of the Policy Favoring Arbitration
Statutory reforms, first in New York and then at the federal level, radically 
changed the law governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements. In New York, a 
group of reformers sought to ease the judiciary’s burden by fostering arbitration. In 1923, 
a leader of the reform movement stated its goals as follows:
a. To reduce the cost to the consumer, without taking it out of the 
producer.
b. To reduce the law’s delay and consequently what amounts virtually to 
a denial of justice.
c. To save time, trouble and money to disputants, the law office, and the 
state.
d. To preserve business friendships.
31 Id. at 185-86; see Tobey v. County of Blistol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313, 1321-23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story, 
J.).
32
 Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).
33 Id. at 451.
34 Id. at 452.
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e. [Arbitration] is voluntary.  No one need agree to arbitrate unless it is 
his wish.35
To accomplish these goals, the reformers sought foremost to reverse the rule holding 
arbitration agreements “revocable.” The 1920 New York arbitration statute provided that 
a written contract to settle an existing or future dispute was “valid, enforceable and 
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”36 Courts were authorized to make orders directing arbitration to proceed as 
provided in the contract or submission37 and to appoint arbitrators if the parties failed to 
do so.38 Moreover, the courts could stay litigation that was inconsistent with an 
arbitration agreement.39
The reformers proceeded to campaign for reform on the federal level. In 1925, 
Congress enacted the FAA.40 Like the New York statute, the FAA mandates the 
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”41 Courts can stay judicial 
proceedings and compel arbitration.42 Courts can appoint arbitrators when necessary.43
35 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION 29-30 (1992) (citing Charles Bernheimer’s introduction to Appendix B of the 
A.B.A. Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law’s 1924 report).
36 New York Arbitration Act, ch. 275, § 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804.
37 Id. § 3.
38 § 4, 1920 N.Y. Laws at 805.
39 Id. § 5.
40 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)).
41 Id. § 2.
42 §§ 3-4, 43 Stat. at 883-84.
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Motions for stays or to compel litigation are made and heard as motions,44 obviating the 
need for complaints or other court filings. Arbitrators are empowered to issue subpoenas 
for evidence from parties and nonparties alike.45 Courts were empowered to confirm 
valid awards or vacate awards that were infirm by the statutory criteria.46
Even so, the old judicial hostility persisted. In Wilko v. Swan,47 in 1953, the 
Supreme Court found that arbitration was substantive in its implications because it was 
an inferior form of dispute resolution for important substantive claims. Wilko was 
overruled in this regard in 1989.48
The beginning of the Supreme Court’s shift was in 1967. In Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,49 the Court eliminated any powerful judicial role in 
supervising arbitration agreements. The claim was one of fraud in the inducement of a 
contract containing an agreement to arbitrate disputes that arose out of or related to the 
contract or a breach thereof. The issue before the Court was whether a claim of fraud in 
the inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the court in which a stay of 
litigation is sought, or, rather, should be referred to the arbitrators.
43 § 5, 43 Stat. at 884.
44 Id. § 6.
45 Id. § 7.
46 §§ 9-10, 43 Stat. at 885.
47 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
48
 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-83 (1989).
49 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had taken the view that, as a matter 
of federal substantive law, arbitration clauses are “separable” from the contracts in which 
they are embedded; hence, when no claim was made that fraud was directed to the 
arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause would commit the question of fraud in 
the container contract to the arbitrators.50 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, by 
contrast, had taken the view that the question of “severability” should be decided as a 
matter of state law; where a state regards arbitration clauses as inseparable from the 
remainder of the agreement, the question of fraud would be for the courts.51 The Second 
Circuit’s view was upheld. The FAA, as interpreted, deprived the courts of a device that 
otherwise could be used to keep cases away from arbitrators.
Any doubt that the Supreme Court’s attitude had changed became difficult to 
maintain after three decisions in the 1980s. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Const. Corp.,52 the Court announced that there was a federal policy favoring 
arbitration. The issue involved arbitrability, this time a claim that one party to an 
arbitration agreement had “lost any right to arbitration under the contract due to waiver, 
laches, estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for arbitration.”53 First, the Court 
read Prima Paint to manifest a policy of the FAA to require “a liberal reading of 
50 Id. at 402.
51 Id. at 402-03 (citing Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 923-24 (1st Cir. 1960)). 
52 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
53 Id. at 7.
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arbitration agreements” so that, for example, “some issues that might be thought relevant 
to arbitrability are themselves arbitrable.”54 Second, it announced that 
[q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal 
policy favoring arbitration. . . .  The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of 
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of 
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability.55
Then, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,56 the Court wrote that, in enacting FAA § 2, 
“Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration [for disputes within the 
Commerce Clause] and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for 
the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”57
In 1985, the court decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,58
which involved the arbitrability of antitrust claims advanced under the Sherman Act and 
within a valid arbitration clause in an international contract. The court of appeals had 
reasoned that “the pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the 
nature of the claims that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust claims . . . 
inappropriate for arbitration.”59 The Court found no “explicit” support for such an 
54
 Id. at 22 n.27.
55
 460 U.S. at 24-25.
56 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
57 Id. at 10.
58 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
59 Id. at 629 (citing Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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exception in either the Sherman Act or the FAA.60 It held that antitrust claims were 
arbitrable, at least when arising from an international transaction. Since Mitsubishi, a 
series of decisions has expanded the realm of arbitrable disputes to encompass such 
statutory claims as those arising under the federal securities law,61 RICO,62 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act,63 and Title VII employment disputes.64 Following 
Mitsubishi, the Court appears to assume that, if Congress intended a statute’s substantive 
protection to include protection from waiving a judicial forum, “that intention will be 
deducible from text or legislative history.”65
The policy favoring arbitration should be taken seriously. This policy reaches by 
far the lion’s share of contractual transactions within the United States, so long as they 
60 Id. at 628-29.
61
 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
62 Id. at 242; PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
63
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  An arbitration agreement between an 
employer and an employee does not, however, bar the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 
proceeding in court. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 287-88 (2002).  According to the Supreme 
Court, moreover, an agreement that prevents the effective vindication of statutory rights may be 
unenforceable.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000); see also Cole v. 
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
64 E.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998). Contra Duffield v. Robertson 
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998).
65 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. Congress has made pre-dispute arbitration agreements in 
motor vehicle franchise agreements unenforceable. 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2002).
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affect interstate commerce.66 The policy pre-empts inconsistent state laws.67 Through the 
FAA § 2, it is applicable in state courts.68 In light of the burgeoning number of cases 
brought to arbitration, arbitration might be in the process of replacing litigation as the 
primary method of compulsory dispute settlement for contract and related civil cases.
II.  Justifications for the Policy Favoring Arbitration
A.  Justifications 
That the Supreme Court adheres to a strong policy favoring arbitration does not 
mean that there should be such a policy. One normative reason, however, supports such a 
conclusion.69 It is freedom of contract, premised on the value of party autonomy. 
Moreover, the parties may wish to enter an arbitration agreement for three reasons.  First, 
the parties themselves may with to balance accuracy of results, procedural fairness, and 
66
 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 
265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 482, 489 (1987). Contracts of employment for transportation 
workers are excluded by the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
67
 Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 
F. Ct. 1212 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281; Perry, 482 U.S. at 490-91; Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 16 (1984); Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 
IND. L.J. 393, 425 (2004).
68 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12.
69
 Supporters of arbitration often tout the privacy of arbitration proceedings and the secrecy of most awards, 
which in domestic cases generally do not give reasons anyway, as a virtue of arbitration.  Surely many 
parties prefer privacy, and for them this is an advantage when choosing whether to agree to arbitrate.  
Privacy is not, however, a reason supporting the policy favoring arbitration.  Privacy and the secrecy of 
awards hampers the further development of the law because arbitration sets no precedents. See Owen M. 
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-89 (1984).  The general secrecy of awards is a drawback 
to the policy favoring arbitration, especially in arbitration of statutory claims, such as employment 
discrimination claims.
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adjudicative efficiency differently from the way the courts do it in civil litigation. The 
second is arbitration’s capacity to serve as an alternative to a slow and sometimes 
terrifying civil litigation system. The third is the value of allowing parties to balance 
accuracy of results against the finality of decisions, also doing it differently from the way 
the courts do it. On the whole, it should be concluded, the Supreme Court’s policy is 
reasonable.  
1.  Freedom of Contract:  Party Autonomy
In principle, allowing contract parties to agree to settle disputes by arbitration
enhances party autonomy. It expands freedom of contract by allowing parties to contract 
out of civil litigation, making litigation a default method of settling disputes.70 With an 
arbitration alternative, parties are not faced with a choice between litigation and nothing 
(insofar as compulsory methods of dispute resolution are concerned). They have the 
alternatives of litigation, arbitration or nothing. By contrast with litigation, arbitration is 
highly flexible. The parties can fashion the procedure as best suits their needs. Hence, 
arbitration empowers people to better control their own destinies.  
Most of the cases reviewed for this Article involve adhesion contracts containing 
arbitration clauses. Adhesion contracts are standard form contracts drafted and “imposed” 
by a strong party on another with less bargaining power. Negotiations over the pre-
printed terms – those that are not added to the form, such as the price term – are not 
70
 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 703 (1999).
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allowed. The weaker party rarely reads or understands the pre-printed terms.71
Sometimes, important terms are in fine print or obscure language that discourages 
understanding.72 Adhesion contracts are ubiquitous in the American economy. One 
scholar suggests that ninety-nine percent of contracts entered into in the United States are 
adhesion contracts.73
It has been argued that the party autonomy rationale does not reach adhesion 
contracts.74 The weaker party cannot negotiate the pre-printed terms. Assent to the 
arbitration clause is not subjectively present because that party normally does not read or 
understand those terms.75 For practical purposes, however, the general scholarly debate 
on adhesion contracts is beside the point. Under the Supreme Court’s arbitration 
decisions, adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses cannot be treated differently 
from adhesion contracts generally.76 Because adhesion contracts, including the fine print, 
71
 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. 
REV. 629, 632 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1179 (1983).
72 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 534 (2nd ed. 1998). 
73
 W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. 
L. REV. 529, 529 (1971).
74
 Rakoff, supra note 71, at 1180, 1183-90.
75
 See, e.g., Carrington & Castle, supra note 11, at 218-220; Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, 
“Volunteering” To Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s 
Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 73-74 (2004).  See generally Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser 
Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2002).
76
 Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
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generally are enforced,77 the arbitration clauses must be enforced unless they are 
unenforceable for other reasons.
As a normative matter, moreover, it can be argued that adhesion contracts
generally should be enforced. One reason is that, it has been suggested, the relevant 
subjective assent is present because the weaker party signs the form contract normally 
knowing that there are terms in that they do not understand. Those parties nonetheless 
intend to be bound by all of the terms of the contract.78 Indeed, it would be unreasonable 
and unworkable to require that each party subjectively assent to each term in a form 
contract. In part for the same reason, moreover, a reasonable person in the stronger 
party’s position would understand that the weaker party assented to the contract and that 
all of the terms bind both parties. According to the objective theory of contract, the 
weaker party therefore is bound.79
There are three further reasons supporting the objective theory in this context. 
First, the objective theory generally is employed for other contract formation issues and 
for purposes of interpretation.80 It would be incoherent to employ the subjective theory 
only for adhesion contracts or adhesion contracts containing arbitration agreements. 
77
 X-ref
78 See Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonneborn, 225 A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1967) (“[T]he law presumes that a 
person knows the contents of a document that he executes and understands at least the literal meaning of its 
terms.”).
79 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002); Joseph M. Perillo, 
The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 
(2000).
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Second, the objective theory protects the stronger party’s reliance interest, as does 
modern contract law.81 Third, as has long been understood, there are many good reasons 
for the stronger party to employ form contracts and to refuse to negotiate the pre-printed 
terms. Form contracts are, in a word, efficient.82 There is reason to believe that arbitration 
clauses lower the contract price of the goods, services or money, or provide weaker 
parties with more advantageous terms, because arbitration reduces the parties’ joint costs 
of contracting.83
2.  Procedural Fairness, Efficiency and Accuracy
In a throwback to Wilko v. Swan,84 the principal concern of contemporary courts 
seems to be that a weaker party’s contract or related rights may not be effectively 
vindicated in an arbitration proceeding.85 (We should assume that this attitude does not 
reflect a pro-employee, pro-consumer–pro-claimant–bias because that would be 
indefensible when structuring procedures.) There is, however, no evidence that 
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS R2 definition of a promise; §§ 20, 24, 201(2); definition of 
acceptance.
81 Id. §§ 87(1), 90 (1981); Fuller & Perdue.
82
 Llewellyn.  Summarize (see Farnsworth).  Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1208-1225 (2003).
83
 Korobkin, supra note 82, at 1275-76; Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation 
of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89.  But see Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. 
Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or 
Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 93 (2004) (criticizing Ware).
84
 X-ref
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arbitration is worse than litigation at achieving accuracy of results. What little empirical 
work we have suggests that arbitrators decide cases much as judges do, and with less 
cognitive distortion than juries suffer from.86 Juries in some parts of the country might be 
more pro-employee and pro-consumer than arbitrators, but this is speculative and 
irrelevant.87 Arbitration might in fact be more effective than litigation at achieving 
accuracy of results. There are normally no pre-trial substantive motions, discovery wars, 
antiquated rules of evidence or juries allowing clever advocates to skew the results. In 
addition, even when operating at its best, the civil litigation system must be assumed to 
reach inaccurate results in some cases.
Even if there is not better accuracy of results in arbitration, the parties should be 
empowered to trade off their interests in procedural fairness and efficiency, on one hand, 
and accuracy of results, on the other, by streamlining and tailoring their procedure to the 
needs of the case. Typically, there is no practice involving delays due to motions to 
85
 The Supreme Court limits the relevant rights to “statutory rights” involving a public interest.  Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991).  For the California Supreme Court’s similar 
view, see Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 795 (2005).
86
 Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 
107 (2004).  It is a popular conjecture that arbitrators often make compromise awards rather than 
determining the parties’ rights and duties, but there is no empirical support for this.  Id. at 115-16.
87
 See id. at 116-18.  After reviewing the available empirical data, Professors Sherwyn, Estreicher, and 
Heise concluded that “plaintiffs do not fare significantly better in litigation, that arbitration provides a 
quicker resolution than litigation, and that available data do not indicate whether damages are fairer under 
either system.”  Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical 
Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1564 (2005).  In one recent study, for example, female employees 
prevailed in arbitration much more often than similarly-situated women in litigation, though the amounts of 
the awards were lower.  Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Something for Nothing: When Women Prevail in 
Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573 (2005).
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dismiss, summary judgments, and directed verdicts. Rather, proceedings tend to go 
directly to a hearing on the merits. Consequently, arbitration is often quicker and cheaper 
for the parties than litigation, even after the costs and fees are taken into account. (Of 
course, an arbitration can go wrong and be even slower and more expensive than 
litigation.)
The civil litigation system has a one-size-fits-all procedure  in each jurisdiction 
(except in small claims courts), embodied in generally applicable procedural rules. It 
balances these policies in one way, sacrificing procedural fairness and accuracy in some 
cases in the name of judicial efficiency. For example, consider the availability of a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.88 At this stage, a court must balance a 
plaintiff’s interest in his or her day in court against judicial efficiency. It is inefficient to 
spend resources on meritless claims. However, some dismissals will be mistakes, and 
everyone knows it. The litigation system is prepared to sacrifice some degree of accuracy 
in the interests of fairness to the defendant and judicial efficiency. The parties should be 
able to tailor their procedure to their case, balancing procedural fairness, efficiency and 
accuracy of results differently from the way the litigation system does it. Because there 
are no pre-hearing dismissals or extensive discovery, arbitration may be capable of doing 
a better job at balancing these values in the parties’ interests.
Commercial parties very often find arbitration sufficiently fair, efficient and 
accurate. They commonly contract out of litigation by concluding arbitration 
88 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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agreements.89 Almost no one criticizes the arbitration alternative for commercial cases.90
By analogy and inference from the commercial practice, there is no reason to presume 
that arbitration practice is too unfair, inefficient or inaccurate for noncommercial parties.
3. Alternative to a Crippled Civil Litigation System
Not everyone thinks the American litigation system does a good job. Among the 
criticisms are those aimed at lengthy delays due to crowded dockets, discovery wars, 
arcane rules of evidence and the obsolescence of jury trials in civil cases.91 These features 
of American litigation, and others, raise the parties’ costs so that many cases are not 
worth filing. Trials, moreover, are becoming far less prevalent as judges engage in 
managerial judging and helping the parties to negotiate settlements.92
Arbitration generally dispenses with these troublesome features. In particular, 
hearings are almost always held; arbitrators do not mediate cases. Parties consequently 
may be more likely to get a “day in court.” For those who want out of litigation, the 
arbitration alternative should be available. There will still be cases in which the costs of 
arbitration exceed the amount of a claim or otherwise discourage proceeding. There is 
89
 L.rev. See Joseph T. McLaughlin & Karen M. Crupi-Fitzgerald, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the 
Corporate Sector, Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts: Feb. 28, 2001, 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study Materials American Law Institute – American Bar Association Continuing 
Legal Education A.L.I.-A.B.A.; Thomas J. Brewer, The Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes: Freedom To 
Contract for an Alternative Forum, 66 Antitrust L.J. 91, 92 (1991).
90
 For the exception, see Carrington & Castle, supra note 11.
91
 L. rev.
92 See generally Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255 (2005); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
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every reason to believe that this happens less in arbitration than in civil litigation, 
especially for consumer and employment claims.93
Arbitration is especially important in international commercial cases. Foreign 
recognition of United States judgments is difficult, reflecting other countries’ disdain for 
the American civil litigation system. Their courts and commentators object to the very 
same features of litigation that arbitration typically dispenses with. It is therefore 
reasonable for American parties, like so many foreigners, to find litigation unappealing. 
Because this is reasonable, courts should not insist that employees and consumers resort 
to litigation as their sole process.
5.  Finality of Awards
In practice, courts vacate few arbitral awards. Judicial scrutiny here falls well 
short of that involved in judicial appellate practice.94 But the absence of a robust appeal 
in arbitration is one of its attractions to many parties. Arbitration law balances the finality 
of awards against the greater accuracy appeals might generate. It finds finality to be of 
greater value.  
The civil litigation system, too, balances finality against accuracy. It sometimes 
finds finality of greater value. Consider, for example, the courts’ refusal to relitigate a 
93
 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative 
Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.  843 (2004).
94
 The parties, however, might agree to expand the scope of an appeal, and at least one court will implement 
their agreement.  Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888-90 (9th Cir. 1997) vacated, 
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Serv., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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case when asked to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment.95 The parties should be able 
to bring themselves under arbitration law’s balance by agreeing to do so. The balance of 
finality and accuracy in arbitration is reasonable even if different from that of the civil 
litigation system. There is nothing sacred about a right to a robust appeal.
B. Scope of the Policy Favoring Arbitration
Consider the FAA § 2, the source of the federal policy favoring arbitration:  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.96
The Supreme Court has held that the savings clause of this statute requires that arbitration 
agreements in transactions affecting interstate commerce be enforced on an equal footing 
with other contracts under state contract law.97
In five cases, the Court has struck down state laws that discriminated against 
arbitration.98 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,99 for example, the Alabama 
legislature had enacted a statute making written, pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
95
96
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
97
 Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 104 S. Ct. 2449, 2453 (1974).
98 In addition to the two cases summarized in the above paragraph, see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc,115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
103 S. Ct. 927 (1984).  See also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 87-95 (S.Ct. 2005).
99
 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
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invalid and unenforceable.100 The Court held it unconstitutional because pre-empted by 
the FAA § 2. In Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto,101 the Montana legislature had enacted
a statute requiring arbitration clauses to be underlined and on the first page of a contract.
Montana’s contract law did not require contract clauses generally to be written this 
way.102 The legislation, therefore, treated arbitration agreements less favorably than 
general contract law would. The Supreme Court held that the Montana statute was 
unconstitutional because pre-empted by the FAA § 2.103
The question raised by this Article is whether courts are free, under these cases
and general principle, to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable when the court’s 
reasons for such a finding disfavor arbitration. On the one hand, the justification for such 
a finding is based in general contract law – the unconscionability doctrine. On the other, 
however, the reasons and consequences may be incompatible with the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.  Existing case law does not resolve this tension. The courts should 
hold that the FAA § 2 pre-empts judicial holdings that disfavor arbitration even if the 
legal basis for the decision is the unconscionability doctrine.
In dicta, the Supreme Court has given conflicting, if not confusing, guidance.  In 
Perry v. Thomas,104 the Court said:
100 Ala. Code § 8-1-41(3) (1993).
101
 517 U.S. at 683; see First Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
102 Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(4) (1995).
103
 For a California statute that might be similarly pre-empted, see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7191 (West 
)(applicable to residential construction contracts).  For an argument that residential construction contracts 
do not affect interstate commerce, see Woolls v. Super. Ct., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 437-39 (Ct. App. 2005).
104 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987).
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Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law 
arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of 
contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the 
fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement 
of [FAA § 2]. [citation omitted] A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of 
litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner 
different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements 
under state law.  Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to 
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be 
unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the 
state legislature cannot.105
This passage makes it clear that FAA § 2 can pre-empt a judicial “holding.” Moreover, 
the last sentence of the passage would seem to say that, even if the legal basis of the 
judicial holding is the unconscionability doctrine, FAA § 2 nonetheless may pre-empt a 
judicial holding if it disfavors arbitration.
Further Supreme Court dictum is more confusing.  In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the 
court wrote:
In any event, § 2 gives States a method for protecting consumers against unfair 
pressure to agree to a contract with an unwanted arbitration provision. States may 
regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law 
principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause “upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” . . . What States may 
not do is to decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all of its basic terms 
(price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The 
Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place 
105 Id. at 2527 n.9 (emphasis original).
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arbitration clauses on an unequal “footing,” directly contrary to the Act’s 
language and Congress’ intent.106
The first two sentences of this passage say that states may hold arbitration agreements 
unconscionable under generally applicable state contract law. The last two sentences, 
however, qualify this position significantly. The penultimate sentence says in effect that 
the arbitration clause should be evaluated in the context of the whole contract. The 
contract, including its arbitration clause, rises or falls on the basis of fairness as a unity. 
This contradicts the second sentence, which says that states may regulate arbitration 
clauses, seemingly singling them out for analysis under the unconscionability doctrine.
Because support can be found for both positions in Supreme Court dicta, we 
should consider what, given existing law, the Court should hold if an appropriate case
were before them.  Consider a hypothetical case: A state supreme court holds that all 
written, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate are unenforceable because unconscionable. 
There is a similarity to and two distinctions between this case and Allied-Bruce Terminix. 
First, the substance of the hypothetical holding is identical to that of the Alabama statute 
in Allied-Bruce Terminix. Second, the decision was made by a court, not a legislature.  
Perry is clearly correct that a court should not be able to do what a legislature cannot. A 
court can undermine the relevant federal policy as effectively as does a legislature 
because the consequences are the same. The fact that the hypothetical case involves state 
law “of judicial origin” makes no difference. Third, the hypothetical state court based its 
decision on a doctrine of general contract law.  For the same reason, this should make no 
difference. The consequences undermine the relevant federal policy as effectively as 
106 115 S.Ct. at 843.
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would legislation without a contract law basis. The hypothetical case cannot be 
distinguished meaningfully from Allied-Bruce Terminix.
It might be argued that the basis of the hypothetical holding makes a significant 
difference. The unconscionability doctrine is a doctrine of general contract law and, it 
might be argued, falls within the savings clause of FAA § 2:  “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”107 Unconscionability, it might 
be argued, is a “ground” for the revocation of any contract. Such a conceptual argument, 
however, is not persuasive. The statute should not be read to manifest a “strong” federal 
policy favoring arbitration, which pre-empts contrary state laws, but to allow contrary 
state laws that rest on a doctrine of contract law. State laws and judicial holdings with 
contrary consequences for the federal policy should be pre-empted whatever their legal 
garb. The holding in the hypothetical case puts arbitration agreements on an unequal 
footing with other contracts and should be pre-empted.
No court has made such a broad holding as that in the above hypothetical case. 
Rather, as will be seen in the next Part of this Article, the courts proceed in a piecemeal 
fashion, striking arbitration agreements down one case at a time due to “unconscionable” 
features of each particular clause. The courts should not be able to do piecemeal what 
they could not do in one stroke.
III. Unconscionability and Arbitration Agreements
107 (emphasis added).
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A synthesis of the cases reviewed for this Article indicates that, since 2000, many 
courts have been refusing to enforce arbitration agreements.108 The usual ground for such 
refusals is unconscionability.109 These decisions, however, often misuse the 
unconscionability doctrine, qualified by the policy favoring arbitration as required by 
federal law.110 They focus on reasonableness or fairness standards. These are not the 
unconscionability standards in general contract law. Using these vague standards results 
in treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other contracts, a result that is pre-
empted by the FAA.111 In addition, the relevant courts use the civil litigation system as 
the standard, striking arbitration agreements that are not equal to it procedurally.112 This 
favors litigation over arbitration, depriving parties of the advantages of arbitration and 
violating the federal policy favoring arbitration. It is hard to resist the conclusion that 
there is a new judicial hostility to arbitration in noncommercial cases.113
A.  Unconscionability
108
 See also Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 
52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004).
109
 Outside the reported decisions, there is no empirical basis for believing that abuse by the stronger party 
is widespread.  One empirical study found, to the contrary, that egregious self-dealing was unusual.  
Demaine & Hensler, supra note 75, at 72.  See Drahozal, supra note 2.
110
 X-ref.
111 X-ref.
112 E.g., Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Ct. App. 2004).
113 See Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The cry of 
‘unconscionable!’ just repackages the tired assertion that arbitration should be disparaged as second-class 
adjudication.”) (Easterbrook, J.). 
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Courts may strike down arbitration agreements when they are unconscionable 
under general contract law. As a matter of contract law, however, the unconscionability 
doctrine is not a license for courts to police agreements for reasonableness or fairness. To 
find a contract or contract provision unconscionable, a court must find that it is both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.114 Procedural unconscionability consists 
in an absence of meaningful choice on the part of a party with grossly weaker bargaining 
power.115 Substantive unconscionability consists of a “gross disparity in the values 
exchanged.”116 Note that the tests require gross disparities in the making of the contract
and in its substantive terms. It is sometimes said that the contract or term must be 
“harsh,” “oppressive,” and “shock the conscience” to justify a finding of 
unconscionability.117
The phrases "harsh," "oppressive," and "shock the conscience" are not
synonymous with "unreasonable." Basing an unconscionability determination on 
the reasonableness of a contract provision would inject an inappropriate level of 
judicial subjectivity into the analysis. With a concept as nebulous as 
“unconscionability” it is important that courts not be thrust in the paternalistic role 
of intervening to change contractual terms that the parties have agreed to merely 
114
 Contra Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Utah 
2004)(alone, substantive unconscionability suffices); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 
574 (1998)(same).  See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
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 Id. cmt. c.i
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 Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Ct. App. 1997).
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because the court believes the terms are unreasonable. The terms must shock the 
conscience.118
The doctrine, moreover, allows the stronger party to show that the contract or term, even 
if grossly unfair, is justified by business needs. If so, the term is upheld.119  In addition, 
an unconscionable term can be severed from the remainder of the contract if the 
unconscionability does not pervade the contract.120 Apart from the cases involving 
arbitration agreements, the courts do not often strike down an agreement or term for 
being unconscionable.  
Finding arbitration agreements unconscionable consequently does not violate the 
FAA § 2 or its policy favoring arbitration per se. An arbitration agreement that appears 
not to allow the effective vindication of a claimant’s (or respondent’s) rights might 
appear to be unconscionable per se. But, as indicated above, it should be up to the parties 
to decide whether and how to trade off accuracy, on the one hand, and procedural 
fairness, finality and efficiency, on the other.121 The courts often ignore the latter side of 
the balance. Moreover, the cases do not present themselves in such terms. Rather, an 
arbitration agreement may have a particular feature or combination of features that 
contribute(s) to a court’s conclusion that the agreement is unconscionable and 
118
 Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 809 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
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 Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1046 (2001); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare 
Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 770 (2000); see also UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(2)(2004); 
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120 Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773.
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unenforceable. For example, it may be an adhesion contract, limit discovery, or allow the 
employer to litigate while the employee must arbitrate. Not every feature that 
disadvantages a claimant, however, is a valid reason to hold that the agreement is 
unconscionable.122 That depends on a closer examination of the court’s reasoning in the 
case.  
There are three major additional reasons for closely scrutinizing judicial reasoning 
in this context. First, as indicated by Doctor’s Associates, a finding of unconscionability 
must not single out arbitration for different treatment than that afforded by contract law 
generally. In contract law, it is rare for a court to declare an agreement unconscionable 
simply because of  perceived unreasonableness or unfairness. The policy of contractual 
freedom requires deference to the parties’ value judgments, even when they are not the 
judgments the judge would make or approve of. Second, the unconscionability doctrine 
requires the courts to consider whether there is a special business need that justifies the 
questioned provision.123 When there is, the agreement is not unconscionable. Third, a 
court should take into account the policy favoring arbitration when deciding the 
unconscionability question. More important, the mere fact that an arbitration proceeding 
will differ from litigation is not a legitimate reason for striking down an arbitration 
agreement. It is one of the great advantages of arbitration generally that the parties may 
simplify and tailor the arbitration proceeding to their case. The policy favoring arbitration 
should be given the effect of requiring due respect for such advantages over litigation.
122
 Of course, a pro-claimant bias would be inappropriate.
123 UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(2) (2004); Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773.
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Consider a case holding that an arbitration clause is unconscionable because it 
lacks “mutuality:”124 The employee must arbitrate while the employer may litigate.125
Such a holding fails for all three reasons. First, it singles out arbitration for special 
treatment. If there is consideration, there is no requirement of “mutuality” in contract law 
generally.126 If there were, it would view the contract as a whole when deciding the 
question, not the arbitration provision in isolation.127 Second, there may be a special 
business need that justifies the provision. In employment relationships, for example, the 
employer may need access to the courts to obtain a quick preliminary injunction to 
prevent an employee from divulging trade secrets or competing in violation of a covenant 
124 Armendariz requires a “modicum of bilaterality” within the arbitration clause, which amounts to a 
requirement of mutuality.  99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at ___.  See Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 
862, 871 (D. Or. 2002).  
125 E.g., Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at ___; Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 669-70 
(Ct. App. 2004); O’Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 121-25 (Ct. App. 2003); 
Mercuro v. Super. Ct., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 676-77 ( Ct. App. 2002); see Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit 
Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002).  For consumer cases with similar effect, see Palm Beach Motor 
Cars Ltd. v. Jeffries, 885 So. 2d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn.
2004).
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 Bischoff v. DirecTV, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Gray v. Conseco, Inc., No. SA CV 
00-322DOC(EEX), 2000 WL 1480273 (C.D. Cal. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(c) 
(1981).
127 Glazer v. Lehman Bros., 394 F.3d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 2005); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 143-44 
(Me. 2005).  But see Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 A.2d 656 (2003) (lack of 
mutuality affecting only the arbitration clause renders that clause unenforceable because it is separable 
under Prima Paint).  Cheek mistakes Prima Paint.  That case holds only that arbitration clauses are 
separable from container contracts for the purpose of allocating decisionmaking authority as between courts 
and arbitrators.  Accordingly, it held that fraud in the inducement of a container contract presented a 
question for the arbitrators.  X-ref.  It did not hold that an arbitration clause is separable for purposes of 
determining whether it is enforceable.
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not to compete.128 Empanelling an arbitral tribunal would take too long, and the tribunal 
may not have the power to issue preliminary injunctions.129 Third, the policy favoring 
arbitration argues against unconscionability in such cases. The inference is irresistible 
that such a holding is premised on a belief that the employee is disadvantaged by having 
to arbitrate while the employer is advantaged because it can litigate, irrespective of the 
particular features of the arbitration. Supposing that the employee is thus disadvantaged 
supposes that arbitration is inferior to litigation. Such a supposition violates the policy 
favoring arbitration.
B.  Armendariz and the Effective
Vindication of Statutory Claims
Before turning to an evaluation of judicial decisions finding arbitration 
agreements unconscionable, a different issue should be distinguished. In Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,130 the U.S. Supreme Court held that claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act131 are arbitrable, continuing its line of cases holding 
that claims under statutes are arbitrable.132 It did not hold, however, that wherever an 
employee has concluded an arbitration agreement such claims must be arbitrated 
128 See Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422 (Ct. App. 2004); Pitts v. Watkins, 905 So. 
2d 553 (Miss. 2005).
129
 In contrast, the California arbitration statute empowers arbitrators to issue court injunctions.  Cal. Code 
Civ. Proced. 
130 Armendariz, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
131 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 ().
132
 X-ref.
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regardless of the characteristics of the arbitration.133 Recognizing the public interest in 
statutory claims, the court indicated that the arbitration agreement must provide for the 
“effective vindication of statutory rights.”134 It did not state the minimum conditions 
under which statutory rights could be effectively vindicated in arbitration.
The California Supreme Court stated such conditions in the leading case of 
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.135 Two employees had 
brought an action against their employer under California’s Fair Employment and 
Housing Act.136 Their contract of employment, however, contained an arbitration clause.  
The employer moved to compel arbitration. The court refused to enforce the “mandatory” 
arbitration agreement on both effective vindication and unconscionability grounds. With 
respect to effective vindication, the court stated four conditions:  (1) the arbitrator must 
be neutral; (2) the arbitration agreement must provide for adequate discovery; (3) the 
arbitration agreement must require the arbitrator to make a written award to permit a 
limited form of judicial review; and (4) the employer must bear the costs of the 
arbitration insofar as they have no parallel in litigation (such as the arbitrator’s fee).
133 See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (interpreting Gilmer). 
134 Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 916, 923 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (citing the 
Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Gilmer in Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 313 
(2000)).
135
 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (2000).
136 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 2005).
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Gilmer’s and Armendariz’s effective vindication rationale, it should be 
emphasized, is applicable only to arbitration of statutory claims.137 It has its basis in the 
policy of the statute under which the claim is brought, not contract law.138
Unconscionability is a matter of contract law and forms a separate basis for invalidating 
an arbitration agreement. This Article is concerned only with unconscionability. 
Nonetheless, as in Armendariz, many courts employ the unconscionability doctrine to 
invalidate agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. This Article takes these cases into 
account in the following evaluation. Because of the separate effective vindication 
rationale for statutory cases, an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim should be held
unconscionable under contract law only if the same agreement to arbitrate a common law 
claim also would be unconscionable.
C.  Judicial Treatment of Arbitration Agreements
As indicated, many courts are striking down pre-dispute arbitration agreements in 
noncommercial cases on the ground that they are unconscionable. They find these 
agreements procedurally unconscionable simply because they are parts of adhesion 
contracts: A stronger party presents them to a weaker party in a standard form contract on 
a take-it-or-leave-it basis, not allowing negotiations over the arbitration term. They find 
such agreements substantively unconscionable for a host of reasons. Few of these 
reasons, however, hold up under close scrutiny, though there are cases in which a finding 
of unconscionability is justified. From this, one may easily infer that there is a new 
137
 Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 787, 795-96 (2005).
138
 Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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hostility to arbitration.
1.  Procedural Unconscionability 
Many arbitration agreements contained in adhesion contracts will be found in 
contracts between stronger and weaker parties. Such contracts are generally 
enforceable.139 “[T]here is a central theme that runs through the . . . law . . . : contracts of 
adhesion, like negotiated contracts, are prima facie enforceable as written.”140 Respected 
scholars criticize this law. They advocate, for example, that contracts of adhesion be 
considered prima facie unenforceable and reviewable for fairness.141 Notably, many 
courts have adopted substantially the scholar’s view in recent cases involving arbitration 
agreements. These courts hold that adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses are 
per se procedurally unconscionable, but usually that substantive unconscionability is also 
required to render the contract unenforceable.142 There is something audacious in 
asserting that perhaps 99% of the contracts made in the United States are procedurally 
unconscionable (or prima facie unenforceable).143 Indeed, clearly, the courts are not so 
holding. A business, moreover, should be able to decide the terms on which it will do 
139 FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, at 534-35.
140
 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1176 
(1983). 
141 Id.; W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).  See also Perillo; KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 
(1960).
142 E.g., Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 669 (Ct. App. 2004); Flores v. Transamerica 
Homefirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382 (Ct. App. 2001); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 
145-46 (Ct. App. 1997).
39
business – and they normally do in many respects.144 Consider, for example, a firm that 
offers cars only with two-year limited warrantees. It offers the warrantee term on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis with no negotiations allowed, and it does not make extended 
warrantees available for an additional price. It would be absurd to find that the contract or 
the warrantee term is procedurally unconscionable for this reason. If the salesman does 
not mention the limited warrantee and the consumer does not ask, there is no subjective 
consent to the specific clause  when the consumer signs the contract so providing. Again, 
however, it would be absurd to consider the contract procedurally unconscionable for this 
reason. Procedural unconscionability requires exceptional pressure by the stronger party 
against the weaker one.145
Adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses are being singled out from the 
general run of adhesion contracts cases decided in recent years.146 This is a problem 
143
 X-ref. Slawson, 84 HLR 529
144
 Employers typically set many conditions of employment, such as health insurance, life insurance, 
pension plans, noncompetitition agreements, on a take-it-or-leave it basis.  David Sherwyn, Because It 
Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail To Fix the Problems Associated 
with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 30 (2003); David
Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing 
Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 146-47 
(1999).
145 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1264-65 (2003).
146
 Adhesion contracts are not enforced when they involve exclusions of remedies, exculpatory clauses, and 
indemnity clauses.  Farnsworth Treatise.  The recent cases considered in this Article strongly suggest that 
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts are being treated similarly as a new subcategory of all adhesion 
contracts.  The former clauses, however, relieve a party of all liability under a contract or for its torts.  An 
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under Doctor’s Associates:147 The FAA § 2 requires that arbitration agreements be treated 
on the same footing as other contracts. Laws treating them differently are pre- empted.148
Evidently, the courts are hostile to arbitration because they accord less respect to 
arbitration agreements in employment and consumer contracts than to contracts 
generally.149 Such hostility is exactly what the FAA § 2 seeks to end.150
Consider four cases. In one, the court may hold that an arbitration agreement in an 
adhesion contract was procedurally unconscionable (in part) because the arbitration 
clause was in fine print or otherwise inconspicuous.151 This holding is inconsistent with 
Doctor’s Associates. Even terms in fine print generally are enforced.152 In a second, the 
court finds procedural unconscionability because the stronger party did not explain to the 
weaker party what rights it was forgoing.153 Even when an employer gave an explanation, 
arbitration clause, by contrast, provides an alternate procedure for vindicating rights.  The analogy is 
inadequate to save the arbitration cases considered here.
147
 X-ref.
148
 X-ref
149
 For a court that clearly does this, see Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 
2003).
150
 X-ref.
151
 Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (2003); Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
267, 276 (Ct. App. 2003); Jaramillo v. JH Real Estate Partners, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 525, 535 (Ct. App. 
2003); Fittante v. Palm Springs Motors, Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 671 (Ct. App. 2003); Palm Beach 
Motor Cars, Ltd. v. Jeffries, 885 So. 2d 990, 992-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); E. Ford , Inc. v. Taylor, 826 
So. 2d 709, 715 (Miss. 200 2); see Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).  
152
 Exceptions are for warranty disclaimers under the Uniform Commercial Code.  UNIF. COMMERCIAL 
CODE  § 2-316 (2003).
153 Voyager Life Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 353 F. Supp. 2d 748, 758 ( S.D. Miss. 2005); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 
Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Nev. 2004).  
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one court held that there was procedural unconscionability.154 Again, this is incompatible 
with general contract law, which imposes a duty on each party to read a contract and to 
seek legal advice if necessary.155 Perhaps, even with an explanation, few consumers and 
employees would understand the implications of agreeing to arbitration, or care.  In a 
fourth case, the court found procedural unconscionability despite the fact that it was a 
post-dispute agreement, was not a contract of adhesion, and the weaker party was 
represented by counsel. This decision is almost certainly unprecedented in contract and 
arbitration law. Even strong critics of arbitration would enforce post-dispute arbitration 
agreements, and the presence of a lawyer is significant.156 The courts’ hostility to 
arbitration is clear.157
In addition, many cases find procedural unconscionability because there were no 
negotiations on the arbitration clause,158 or that the weaker party had no alternative 
source for the employment or goods to be provided by the stronger party.159 There is, 
however, no requirement in general contract law that there be give-and-take in the 
154
 Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003).
155
 Norwest Fin. Miss., Inc. v. McDonald, 905 So. 2d 1187, 1194 (Miss. 2005); Perillo.
156 Carrington & Castle, supra note 11, at 218.
157 See Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Ct. App. 2002); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor 
Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1179 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (adhesion contracts have a weaker presumption in favor 
of arbitration than other contracts).
158
 Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 669 (Ct. App. 2004); Abramson v. Juniper 
Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 441 (Ct. App. 2004); see Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 
LLC, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Villa Milano Homeowners Ass’n v. Il Davorge, 102 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 5-6 (Ct. App. 2000).
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negotiation of a contract or each clause of a contract. Requiring such a negotiation 
defeats the value of form contracts, which require uniformity to serve their many 
purposes.160 It appears that these requirements are being imposed only on arbitration 
agreements, in violation of Doctor’s Associates. There is also no requirement in general 
contract law that a contract be held unenforceable because a weaker party had no 
alternative source of supply.161 Antitrust law is available to address the problem of 
monopolies. Otherwise, there are usually competitive alternatives. In any event, there is 
and should be no common law legal guarantee that an employee can get a job, much less 
a particular job, or that a consumer can buy a particular product. One case even held that 
an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because a consumer had no 
choice but to agree to arbitration if it was to borrow from the lender.162 The availability of 
other lenders was not even considered.
2.  Substantive Unconscionability
Even if one were to accept that arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts are 
procedurally unconscionable per se, one must proceed to consider substantive 
unconscionability. In almost all jurisdictions, both procedural and substantive 
159
 Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1993).  But see Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-73 (App. Div. 1998).
160
 X-ref
161 But see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86-87 (N.J. 1960), a case that has not been 
generally followed.
162
 Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va. 1998); see Porpora v. Gatliff Bldg. 
Co., 828 N.E.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Ohio  Ct. App. 2005).
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unconscionability are required to justify finding that a contract is unenforceable.163 In the 
recent cases examined for this Article, the courts have given over twenty different 
reasons for finding an arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable in an 
employment, consumer or similar case. For the reasons given below, it is hard to resist 
the conclusion that many of these cases manifest a new judicial hostility to arbitration.
a.  Costs and Fees
In arbitration, one party bears or both parties share the costs of the arbitration, 
including the arbitrator’s fee and any filing fee. It is possible to shift a winning party’s 
lawyer’s fees to the losing party. The arbitration agreement may address the question of 
costs and fees or, more often, the arbitrator may decide it.164 Unlike civil litigation, there 
is no governmental revenue source to subsidize the proceeding. The lesser cost of 
arbitration on the whole is due mainly to the absence of pre-trial motions, extensive 
discovery and from lower lawyer’s fees that result from a streamlined procedure. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that prohibitively expensive fees may be grounds 
for invalidating an arbitration agreement in a case involving a statute.165 Some courts cite 
costs and fees as a reason to hold that an arbitration agreement is substantively 
unconscionable in nonstatutory cases, too.166 One court focused on the agreement’s 
163
 The exceptions are noted above at note ___.
164
 Arb. Rules.
165
 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000); see Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s of London, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 795-97 (2005) (limiting costs and fees rationale to statutory 
claims); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 907- 09 (2003).
166
 For scholarly criticism, see Budnitz, supra note 4.  Merely requiring a claimant to pay a filing fee he or 
she cannot afford has been held to be substantively unconscionable.  Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. 
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requirement that the parties bear their own lawyer’s fees.167 Another found that the costs 
and fees would be greater than the amount of a consumer’s claim.168 Others hold that 
sharing costs would discourage claimants from bringing claims.169 A fourth wrote simply 
that arbitration would be expensive,170 and four more that arbitration would be more 
expensive than a lawsuit.171 Yet others have disapproved of imposing lawyers’ fees on 
the losing party,172 even when this is left up to the arbitrator.173 And a seventh held that a 
consumer-claimant could not be required to pay any part of the arbitrator’s fee.174
Upon critical scrutiny, holding that these features render an arbitration agreement  
substantively unconscionable is inconsistent with the policy favoring arbitration. The 
high costs of litigating, notably attorney’s fees and the costs of pre-trial motions and 
discovery, frequently discourage potential plaintiffs from bringing claims in court.175
Rptr. 3d 267, 277-78 (Ct. App. 2003).  Of course, there are filing fees in court that sometimes exceed a 
potential plaintiff’s ability to pay.  This holding favors litigation over arbitration, too.
167
 Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 278- 79 (3d Cir. 2004).
168
 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 
So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala.  2002); McNulty v. H&R Block, Inc., 843 A.2d 1267, 1273-74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
169 See O’Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 125-26 (Ct. App. 2003).
170 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003); Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
663, 671 (Ct. App. 2004); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 16 (Mont. 2002); Mendez v. Palm 
Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 602 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
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 Irwin v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108-09 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Lucas v. Cash N 
Advance, Inc. (In re Lucas), 312 B.R. 407, 412 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2004).
172
 Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
173
 Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 331, 339 (2004).
174
 Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D.Or. 2002).
175
 Demaine & Hensler, supra note 75, at 69.
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These costs generally are cheaper in arbitration though the parties must pay filing fees 
and the arbitrator’s fee. There is no basis for finding that arbitration, on the whole, is 
more expensive than litigation. Accordingly, the costs rationale for finding 
unconscionability may be based on false premises. In any event, it fails to distinguish 
arbitration from litigation while preferring litigation as a standard for judging arbitration 
agreements. Consequently, it is incompatible with the policy favoring arbitration.
An agreement that imposes costs and/or fees on the losing party may be 
conscionable, even if not the best arrangement. Such an agreement does not deter an 
employee or consumer from bringing weak claims any more than it deters a respondent 
from defending (i.e., not settling) on the basis of weak defenses. It is fair in this basic 
respect. Several statutes, moreover, allow a court to award costs and fees to the victorious 
party.176 Foreign practice, as in England, routinely involves shifting lawyer’s fees.177 And 
respected scholars advocate fee shifting in the United States.178 True, an employer or 
seller may be better able to afford the costs and fees; consequently, some weaker 
176
 Civil rights and other public interest legislation often includes a fee-shifting provision in order to 
encourage legitimate assertion of the statutory rights.  E.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 
1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (West ) (“Upon motion, a court may award 
attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the 
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest”); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 91003(a), 91012 (West ) 
(allowing the award of attorney’s fees in cases enforcing California’s Political Reform Act).
177 E.g., Elaine A. Carlson, The New Texas Offer-of-Settlement Practice—The Newest Steps in the Tort 
Reform Dance, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 733, 737 (2005); James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and 
Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 225 
(1995); Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Reconciling 
Incentives To Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1863 (1998).
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 Hughes & Snyder, supra note 171; Sherman, supra note 171.
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employee and consumer claims may be discouraged by the prospect. But, again, the costs 
of litigation discourage plaintiffs, too. The rationale does not distinguish arbitration from 
litigation while preferring litigation. Consequently, it violates the policy favoring 
arbitration.
O’Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer Co.,179 illustrates a case in which a court rightly 
found a costs provision unconscionable. The arbitration agreement limited the claimant’s 
recovery to $265. The minimum cost of the arbitration to the claimant would have been a 
$500 arbitration filing fee. 
In addition, it is easy to sever a provision providing for onerous costs and fees, 
leaving the remaining questions to the arbitrator and the arbitration obligation intact.180
Most courts that rely on these reasons, however, do not consider severance. Yet 
severance of an unconscionable term is permitted explicitly under the standard 
formulations of the unconscionability doctrine.181 Moreover, it would seem to be required 
whenever possible by the policy favoring arbitration. This should be an additional, 
independent and sufficient reason to sever. By not severing when it is possible, the courts 
strike down entire arbitration agreements for inadequate reasons. The costs and fees seem 
a pretext for doing so. Hostility to arbitration may be inferred.  
179
 No. 80453, 2002 WL 1454074, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2002).
180 Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003); Healy v. RBC Dain Rauscher, No. C 04-
4873MMC, 2005 WL 387140, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2005); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 130 Cal. Rptr.
2d 892, 900-01 (Ct.App. 2003); McManus v. CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 465 (Ct. 
App. 2003).
181 UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1) (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); 
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 773 (2000).
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b. Procedural Limitations:  Venue, Limitation Periods, Class Actions,
Consolidation, and Discovery
Many courts strike arbitration agreements because the procedure specified in the 
agreement appears to them to be unfair to the employee or consumer, often because 
arbitration would be less favorable than litigation. Again, when designing a procedure, 
the defendant/respondent’s interests also should be taken into account. Accuracy of 
results – not plai ntiff/claimant’s victories – should be the goal. Five procedural elements 
stand out in the cases. The rationales offered here, too, mostly are questionable in light of 
the policy favoring arbitration.
First, some cases hold that it is substantively unconscionable for an agreement to 
require that the arbitration be located far from the employee’s or consumer’s home.182
Presumably, this discourages the weaker parties from bringing claims. The same thing, 
however, is true in the litigation context. Parties normally are free to select their litigation 
forum by agreement, even in adhesion contracts.183 There is no apparent reason why they 
should not be similarly free in arbitration. Moreover, on this issue it is again permissible 
to sever an offending clause from the remainder of the agreement.184 A location provision 
182
 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176-77 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Bolter v. Super. Ct., 104 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 888, 894-95 (Ct. App. 2001). Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566 (Ct. 
App. 1993).  But see Jones v. Genus Credit Mgmt. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 598, 602 ( D. Md. 2005).
183 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, [cite]; Vega-Perez v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.P.R. 
2005); Intershop Commc’ns v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847, 850 (Ct. App. 2002); William W. Park, 
Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration and Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998).
184
 Bolter v. Super. Ct., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 2001); Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745; 
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1) (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208(1) (1981).
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seems easy to excise.185 But some of these courts did not sever the location provision; 
rather, they refused to enforce the entire arbitration agreement.186 The courts might be 
manifesting a pro-plaintiff bias, but (yet again) this in itself would be unjustified. The 
location rationale, absent severance, would seem questionable enough to be inconsistent 
with the policy favoring arbitration.
Second, some litigated arbitration agreements set short deadlines for filing claims 
in arbitration – shorter than the applicable statute of limitations. Courts have held 
arbitration agreements containing such deadlines to be substantively unconscionable.187
The problem with these clauses is real, but they should not be held unconscionable so as 
to destroy the entire arbitration agreement. The refusal to enforce them should be based 
on the public policy underlying the relevant statute of limitations. The offending deadline 
should be severed.188 As with the costs and location cases, impermissible limitations 
provisions do not make the entire arbitration agreement unconscionable. The policy 
favoring arbitration would seem in such a case to mandate severance. 
Third, classwide arbitration generally is permissible.189 Some arbitration 
185
 Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); see Great Earth Cos., Inc. v. 
Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 890-91 (6th Cir. 2002).  These cases put severability on the ground that it was the 
parties’ intentions that the clause could be severed.
186 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165; Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563.
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 Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2003).  A ten day notice-of-claim-
requirement was struck down in Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2001).
188 See Swain, 128 S.W.3d 103.
189 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 1539 U.S. 444 (2003).  See generally Joshua S. Lipshutz, Note, 
The Court’s Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration 
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agreements, however, prohibit it and are, for this reason, held unconscionable.190 This 
prohibition works to the disadvantage of very small claimants, whose claims are not 
viable for arbitration unless combined with many others. In this respect, arbitration within 
such an agreement would seem to be inferior to the litigation alternative, especially when 
the claim may be brought in small claims court.191 But, again, such a comparison is 
beside the point due to the policy favoring arbitration. Litigation does not set the 
standard. Rather, the question is whether the prohibition makes out a “gross disparity in 
the values exchanged”192 – a contractual analysis of substantive unconscionability as 
permitted by the FAA § 2. The parties should be free to trade off any discouragement of 
claims with the advantages of arbitration. 
Moreover, the basis for striking down this clause is the statute or procedural rule 
allowing class actions. The clause therefore may violate public policy. Again, the clause 
can be severed because its unconscionability, if any, does not pervade the arbitration 
Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1677 (2005); Jean Sternlight, As Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 
(2000).
190
 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003); Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 
87 (S.Ct. 2005); Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., No. WD 64196, 2005 WL 1544777, at *8-9 (Mo. Ct. 
App. July 5, 2005).  But see Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868, 877-78 (Ga. 2005); 
Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n 
ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926-27 (N.D. 2005).
191 See generally Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 83.  In AAA arbitration under its consumer rules, the 
arbitration agreement cannot preclude recourse to a small claims court.  Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 
Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes, Rule C-1(d) (effective Sept. 15, 2005), Rule C-
1(d), http://www.adr.org /sp.asp?id=22014.
192
 X-ref.
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agreement.193 Failing to sever it, as some courts have, may seize on a pretext to disfavor 
arbitration.
Fourth, at least one court has refused to enforce an arbitration agreement in part 
due to a prohibition on consolidating claims.194 In litigation, joinder may be permissible 
or even mandatory.195 Again, there is a difference between arbitration and litigation. But 
the comparison again is beside the point of a sound unconscionability analysis; litigation 
does not set the standard. In addition, consolidation generally is not allowed in arbitration 
unless all parties agree to the same arbitration.196 By prohibiting consolidation in an 
arbitration agreement, the stronger party simply signals that it will not agree to a 
consolidated arbitration.197 The clause in effect exercises a right under the law. It does not 
193
 Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SACV 03-130 DOC, 2003 WL 21530185, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 
2003).
194
 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
195 FED. R. CIV. P. 19-20 (mandatory and permissive joinder, respectively).
196 See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 210 F.3d 771, 774 (7 th Cir. 2000); 
Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634, 642 (Ala. 2003).  But see Jonathan R. Waldron, Note, 
Resolving a Split: May Courts Order Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings Absent Express Agreement 
by the Parties?, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 177 (2005).
197 If the consolidation provision of California’s arbitration statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (1982), 
is permissive, as it has been traditionally interpreted to be, the parties should be able to ban consolidation in 
the arbitration agreement due to the state’s policy manifested in the statute.  See Parker v. McCaw, 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 55, 63 (Ct. App. 2005) (“A party may not avoid the terms of separately negotiated unambiguous 
contracts and rewrite them under the authority of California state arbitration procedures contained in 
section 1281.3.”) (internal quotations omitted).  In Yuen v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, the court 
judged consolidation to be an arbitrable issue of contract interpretation.  But see Indep. Ass’n of Mailbox 
Center Owners, Inc. v. Super. Ct., No. D045354, 2005 WL 2249918 (Sept. 16, 2005) (ban on group 
arbitration in a contract of adhesion held to be unconscionable, and therefore, unenforceable under § 
1281.3).
51
disadvantage the weaker party. Using a prohibition on consolidation to refuse 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement seems like a thin pretext to hide an anti-
arbitration bias. Again, such a provision could be severed.
Fifth, some arbitration agreements limit discovery; for example, they may allow 
each party no more than two depositions.198 The absence of discovery or limited 
discovery can be one of arbitration’s virtues because it streamlines the proceeding, 
reducing delay and costs. If enforced, however, a discovery limitation can work, for 
example, to the disadvantage of an employee asserting a claim of discrimination under a 
civil rights statute. Consider such a claim based on a statistical argument.199 The 
employer will have possession of the relevant data. For a claim of harassment, by 
contrast, the testimony of the employee may suffice. Under Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp.,200 the discovery limit probably need not be enforced when it denies an 
avenue for the effective vindication of statutory rights.201 In a nonstatutory case, such as 
one for breach of contract by discharging an employee without cause, effective 
vindication may not be so hampered, if it is relevant.202 No public policy underlying a 
statute is in play; the right in question is a private right.203 Nonetheless, ideally, the extent 
198 Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 88, 97 (Ct. App. 2004).
199 See generally DAVID BALDUS, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980).
200
 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
201
 In Gilmer, discovery more limited than that allowed in federal courts was held not to preclude 
arbitration of statutory rights.  500 U.S. at 31.  See Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (2004).
202
 X-ref.
203 See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (distinguishing public and 
private rights subject to arbitration).
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of discovery should be decided by the arbitrator in light of the shape of the case and the 
parties’ arguments in order to provide a fair hearing – not in the arbitration agreement ex 
ante. In some – but not all – cases, a limit on discovery may be substantively 
unconscionable.204 Yet again, it can be severed.
c.  Unilateral Rights for the Stronger Party
Some cases strike down arbitration clauses because they allow the stronger party 
to change the terms unilaterally. For example, a stronger party may be given a right to 
modify the arbitration agreement.205 Similarly, it may provide for the arbitrator to be 
selected by one party or from a list provided by one party.206 Some of these limitations 
are substantively unconscionable. In particular, the arbitrator surely should be a neutral.
Allowing the stronger party to name the arbitrator in the arbitration agreement, or to 
provide a list from which the arbitrator must be chosen, so destroys the integrity of the 
arbitral proceeding as to “shock the conscience.”
A unilateral right to modify the arbitration agreement is subject to the legal 
204
 In Fitz, the limitation on discovery to two depositions was subject to the power of the arbitrator to allow 
more if it would otherwise be impossible to conduct a fair hearing.  The court found this inadequate to save 
the arbitration clause. By contrast, in Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., the arbitration agreement 
limited discovery to one deposition and one document request.  The court held that this was not 
unconscionable.  12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 672 (Ct. App. 2004).
205 Ramsdell v. Lenscrafters, Inc., 135 F. App’x 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2005); Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. 
Corp., 884 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
206 McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2004); Murray v. United Food and 
Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2002); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 
F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 611 (1981); Burch v. 
Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 49 P.3d 647, 650-51 (Nev. 2002).
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limitation that it must be exercised in good faith.207 The arbitration agreement confers 
discretion on the stronger party. This discretion must be exercised for a reason that was 
reasonably expectable by the weaker party at the time of contract formation.208 The good 
faith limitation on discretion probably does what unconscionability cannot do: It requires 
the stronger party with a unilateral right to modify to establish and maintain fair arbitral 
procedures.209 Under this law, however, the question cannot be decided on the basis of 
the initial arbitration agreement – the one containing the right to modify. It should be 
decided on the basis of the agreement as modified by the stronger party. Only then can it 
be determined whether the modification was made in good faith. On the whole, however, 
though these decisions ignore the good faith check, it cannot be said that they exhibit 
hostility to arbitration.
d. Substantive Limitations
Some courts have seized upon substantive limitations on the arbitrators, contained 
in the arbitration clause, as reasons to strike down the arbitration agreement. In some 
cases, the arbitration agreement limited the remedy the arbitrator could award, excluding 
consequential or punitive damages.210 In one, the agreement imposed a penalty on the 
207 Hooters, 173 F.3d at 938; see Battels v. Sears Nat’l Bank, 365 F.Supp.2d 1205 (M.D. Ala. 2005); see 
also Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284-85 (Ct. App. 1998).
208 See generally STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, 
PERFORMANCE, BREACH AND ENFORCEMENT (1995).
209 Hooters case.
210
 Leonard v. Terminix Int’l. Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002); Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 295-96 (Ct. App. 2002); W. Va. ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 275-76
(W.Va. 2002); see Harper v. Ultimo, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 423 (Ct. App. 2003).  
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weaker party for failing to arbitrate a claim.211 These are substantive matters. They have 
nothing to do with the arbitration procedure. Limiting a remedy is allowable under 
contract law because the law of contract remedies generally consists of default rules. It is 
even permissible under statutes such as RICO.212 The substantive question may turn on 
whether the remedy as limited fails of its essential purpose or is an unconscionable 
term.213 Unless it does, the limitation is effective in litigation as well as arbitration.214 It 
therefore is not a valid reason to strike an arbitration agreement. 
A disallowed limitation on the remedy should result in striking the limitation from 
the contract, as in litigation, not in refusing to enforce the entire arbitration agreement, as 
the courts did in these cases. A penalty for not arbitrating is unenforceable under general 
contract law principles prohibiting agreed damages that are penalties.215 Again, it is not
enforceable in court, either. It therefore is not a valid reason to strike an arbitration 
agreement. In the penalty cases in courts, moreover, the penalty clause is stricken from 
the contract, which is otherwise enforceable.216 Striking down an entire arbitration clause 
due to the inclusion of such a clause is not justified under general contract law. It, too, is 
a pretext.
e.  Miscellaneous Reasons
211
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There are other reasons courts have given that do not fall into one of the above 
categories. Several, nonetheless, are suspect.  
In one case, the arbitration agreement provided that an employee was required to 
submit its case to the employer as a condition precedent to arbitrating. The court held that 
this gave the employer an unfair “peek” and rendered the arbitration agreement 
substantively unconscionable.217 The court could have severed the condition precedent 
without upsetting the balance in the arbitration agreement, but it did not. More important, 
the employer may have had a legitimate business need for such a condition. Making the 
case to the employer before starting an adversarial proceeding permits the employer (a) to 
concede and take corrective or compensatory action, (b) to propose noncompulsory 
methods of alternative dispute settlement, such as mediation,218 or (c) to enter into direct 
settlement negotiations. Any of these events could maintain the relationship between the 
two parties, which might save the employee from finding another job and the employer 
from finding another employee. By not examining the plausible justifications for the 
condition, the court may be reaching its conclusion without due regard for contract law 
and the policy favoring arbitration.
A few other courts have been more straightforward about their prejudice. Thus, 
one announced that negligence claims covered by the arbitration agreement were better 
decided by a jury.219 Another held that arbitration agreements in employment contracts 
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are presumptively substantively unconscionable.220 And a third will not find an 
arbitration agreement enforceable unless it was concluded in a “clear and unmistakable 
manner,”221 another limitation not found in general contract law and inconsistent with 
Allied-Bruce. 
f.  Cumulative Effects
Most cases examined for this study do not find unconscionability for one and only 
one of the above reasons. Two or more reasons are usually given. Consequently, it should 
be considered whether the cumulative effect of several of the above reasons can make an 
arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable when any one of the reasons does not 
suffice. The short answer is that, logically, the whole cannot be greater than its parts. 
Cumulating a number of invalid reasons cannot make out a valid reason.  
It is a different question, however, whether a court can cumulate a number of 
valid reasons, each of which alone may have inadequate weight to tip the scales in favor 
of a finding of unconscionability. The above discussion distinguishes valid from invalid 
reasons, not weightier from less weighty reasons. Consequently, it would seem, many of 
the decisions cited were erroneous under the law and established policy.
Conclusion
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There is a new judicial hostility to arbitration in noncommercial cases. Many 
courts, when asked to enforce an arbitration agreement, seize upon the unconscionability 
doctrine as a pretext to refuse enforcement. The dispute then goes to litigation despite the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. By refusing to compel arbitration under a valid agreement, 
the courts manifestly prefer litigation to arbitration. This violates the policy favoring 
arbitration, which is based in the FAA § 2 and several Supreme Court precedents.
